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D F Projects Properties v H Savy Insurance Company Limited (A790/06)  ZAGPHC 164 (6 June 2008)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(TRANSVAAL PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
Held in PRETORIA
Case no. A790/06
Judgment reserved: 22 May 2008
Judgment handed down: 6/6/08
In the matter between:
D F PROJECTS PROPERTIES Appellant
H SAVY INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED Respondent
 This is an appeal against the whole of the judgment of the Magistrate for the district of Pretoria handed down on the 22 June 2006, in terms whereof judgment was granted against the appellant for payment of US$12 912.00 to the respondent.
 The respondent also lodged a cross appeal in terms whereof it appeals against the decision of the trial court dismissing its claim for payment of the sum of US$1002.00
 The appellant was a defendant in the main action and the respondent in this appeal was the plaintiff. The parties in this appeal will be referred to as in the main action.
 The plaintiff’s action was for payment of insurance premiums based on the defendant’s objection to pay in terms of the alleged agreement of insurance.
 The defendant initially was operating as Dawson & Fraser Projects (PTY) Ltd. It later changed its name to DF Projects Properties (PTY) Ltd.
 During or about 1995 the defendant in its initial names tendered for a building contract on a Fregate Island, an inland approximately 50 kilometres from the main island Mali in Seychelles.
 The contract was for the building of a seven star luxury hotel consisting of 16 rooms and various other accommodation and facilities.
 During or about the beginning of 1996 a building contract was concluded between the defendant and Freegate Island Resorts Limited (owner of the hotel). Of importance to this agreement was a clause providing that in consideration of the Insured named in the schedule has applied to the company and has paid or agreed to pay premium stated in the schedule for the indemnity hereinafter contained.
 The contract sum was US$11 200 000. This was inclusive price for construction of 16 villas, the main hotel complex, Dr Happel’s private residence and to renovate some pigerties and to do a service building. Dr Happel was an influential businessman in Seychelles. He was the owner of Fregate Island Resorts Limited which had a long lease on the island.
 On the 6 March 1996 the defendant wrote a letter to Bonte Insurance Brokers asking for insurance quotation in respect of the building project. It was further indicated that the insurance will be taken in the names of Fregate Island Resorts Ltd Mali.
 Subsequent to the letter of 6 March 1996, the plaintiff supplied the defendant with a questionnaire and proposal form which was completed by Mr Frazer of the defendant. The title of the contract on the form was indicated by Mr Frazer as “Fregate Island Resort”. Name and address of contractor was indicated as Fregate Island Resort Ltd. Mr Frazer then signed as a “propose” indicating underneath the signature “FOR FREGATE ISLAND RESORTS”. The questionnaire and proposal form was completed and signed on the 2 April 1996.
 On the 21 June 1996 the plaintiff issued a policy document which indicated the insured as follows:
DAWSON & FRAZER PROJECTS (PTY) LTD (main contractor), MR IANA FRAZER/MR FRANCES J, FRASER/FREGATE ISLAND LIMITED/DR OTTO HAPPEL/PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT LTD 2 ANY OTHER PARTIES F.T.R.R.T.
 The policy documents aforesaid were accompanied by a letter dated 1 July 1996 addressed to Mr Frazer of Dawson & Frazer. This was addressed to the defendant by the plaintiff’s broker Forbes Reinsurance Broking Services (PTY) Limited. In the letter the defendant was advised that if any of the details in the attached policy documents did not meet with the defendant’s proposal the plaintiff’s brokers should be advised accordingly.
 Subsequent to the letter of 1 July 1996, the defendant wrote a letter dated 4 September 1996 to its brokers Terry McDonough & Co. in terms of which the broker was requested to ensure that the policy document was to change as follows:
MAIN INSURED COMPANY: FREGATE ISLAND LIMITED/D OTTO HAPPEL
OTHER INSURED: DAWSON & FRAZER PROJECTS (PTY) (NOMINATED SUPPLIER AGENT) FRASER/MR F J FRASER
PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT LTD & ANY OTHER PARTIES F I R R I
 In the letter of the 4 September 1996, the broker was also requested to arrange for the driver to collect the cheque for US38 880.00 being for payment of the first premium on the policy for the period 1 June 1996 to 30 June 1997.
 On the 13 March 1997 the plaintiff addressed a letter to Ian A Fraser, Fregate Island Ors, in terms of which the amended schedule to the policy document was enclosed. In terms of the amended schedule the insured were now indicated as follows:
FREGATE ISLAND/DR OTTO HAPPEL (MAN INSURED), DAWSON & FRASER PROJECTS (PTY) LTD, (NOMINATED SUPPLIER/AGENT, (MR IAN A FRASER/F J FRASER, PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT LTD & ANY OTHER PARTIES F.T.R.R.I.
 The schedule was issued on the 11 March 1997 with effective date being the 4 March 1997. The premium payable was indicated as US$1745,00. This was as a result of the increase in the initial contract value which resulted in the additional premium. The increase on the contract value was by US$1, 200 000.00.
 On the 9 April 1997 the defendant requested the plaintiff to extend the insurance cover up to the 30 September 1997 as the defendant envisaged that the project will only be completed by the 30 September 1997. On the same date, the plaintiff addressed a letter to its broker in terms of which the plaintiff requested its broker to extend the period as requested by the defendant.
 On the 23 May 1997, the plaintiff wrote to Mr Ian A Fraser Fregate Island Limited & Ors confirming that the extension from the 1 July 1997 to 30 September 1997 has been effected and that the premium payable was US$11 165.
 The plaintiff further alleged during trial and in its particulars of claim that there was another extension of the insurance cover for the period 11 November 1997 to 6 December in terms of which it was entitled to be paid a premium in the amount of US$1002.00
 The premiums of US$ 1745, US$11 165 and US$1002.00 were never paid and this resulted in the institution of the action against the defendant in the magistrate court Pretoria for the payment of these premiums totalling to US$13 912.00
C. THE ACTION
 The action was instituted on the 7 June 1999. Upon entering an appearance to defend, the defendant requested for further particulars. Subsequent to the furnishing of the further particulars requested, the defendant delivered a special plea and a plea on merits.
 The special plea revolves around the fact that the court did not have jurisdiction as the plaintiff was obliged to refer the dispute for arbitration in terms of Clause 15 of the Insurance agreement. This special plea was decided upon separately and was dismissed by the trial court
 The plaintiff’s cause of action was to the effect that in terms of the Insurance agreement, the defendant was obliged to pay the premiums, secondly, that the extension of the cover was at the defendant’s instance.
 The defence raised by the defendant was that, the insurance agreement was between the plaintiff and Fregate and that the defendant acted as an agent of Fregate Island Limited. Secondly, the defendant averred that the insurance agreement has become void and unenforceable due to fraud which led to fraudulent payout from the policy
D. ISSUES RAISED
 The followings were the main issues raised on appeal:
Whether the trial court properly interpreted the insurance agreement in finding that the appellant was not acting as an agent?
Whether the trial court was right in finding that the allegation of void and unenforceability of the agreement, was not proved.
Whether the trial court was right in finding that the agreement regarding the extension of the insurance cover for the period 21 November 1997 to 6 December 1997 was not proved?
E. DISCUSSIONS, SUBMISSIONS AND FINDINGS
 I now turn to deal with the issues. The issues set out above were raised by counsel on behalf of the defendant.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE INSURANCE AGREEMENT IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ACTING AS AN AGENT OF FREGATE?
The trial court’s finding was criticised as follows: That it premised its finding on the fact that several names are listed under heading “Insured name” with respect erroneously leading to the conclusion that the appellant was severally liable for the payment of the premium. That it relied on the authority that in a contract of insurance, the insured would be liable for the payment of the premium and that his was with respect wrong. That based on all of these, the trial court erred in approaching the matter on the basis that the defendant was liable to pay the premium in the absence of a specific provision providing that the defendant was an agent of Fregate Island Limited.
As correctly pointed out by counsel on behalf of the defendant, the insurance agreement was the source from which the defendant’s liability should be determined. In my view, if the language of the contract is not clear regarding the intention of the parties, then other factors surrounding the conclusion of the agreement and conduct of the parties thereafter should be taken into consideration to establish the real intention of the parties regarding rights and obligations in terms thereof.
27.1.2 The only reference to possible liability to pay the premium is stated as follows in the agreement.
“IN CONSIDERATION OF the insured name in the schedule has applied to the Company and has paid or agreed to pay the premium stated in the schedule for the indemnity hereinafter contained
The company agrees to the terms exceptions and conditions contained herein or endorsed hereon will indemnify the insured in respect of loss damage or liability as detailed on the specification arising from any event during the period of Insurance or during subsequent period for which the company may accept payment” (my own emphasis). This appears as preamble to the agreement.
27.1.3 Remember, the insured referred to in the schedule as on the 21 June 1996 when the policy was issued were as indicated paragraph 12 of this judgment. The main insured was the defendant. Based on this and based on the agreement between the defendant and Fregate Island Limited, the trial court found that the defendant was liable to pay the premiums. However, counsel for the defendant contended that the trial court erred in having any regard to the building contract in terms of which the defendant was obliged to take out a policy. This was an agreement between the defendant and Fregate which had nothing to do with the insurance policy or agreement, so it was argued. Further issue was therefore raised:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HAVING REGARD TO THE BUILDING CONTRACT TO DETERMINE THE DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY TO PAY THE PREMIUMS?
It appears to have been common cause that the insurance agreement was ambiguous as to who has to pay or agreed to pay the premiums. For example, the insured in terms of the schedule are more than one. That is, the defendant, I A Fraser, F J Fraser, Fregate Island Limited Dr Happel, Provincial Development and any other parties. All of these are insured as referred to in the Schedule and are beneficiaries to the policy in the event of pay-out claim. However, the preamble as quoted in paragraph 30 above inter alia refers to the insured who has applied to the company and has agreed to pay the premium.
 The contention by the plaintiff was that the trail court was right in finding that the defendant was the insured responsible for payment of the premiums. In coming to this conclusion, we were urged to take into account surrounding factors to the insurance agreement. In doing so, we were urged to take into consideration inter alia, the building contract. In my view, the trial court was right in taking this factor into consideration. Counsel for defendant during discussion further indicated that before the issuing of the policy on the 21 June 1996, the plaintiff was supplied with a copy of the building contract between the defendant and Fregate Island Ltd in terms of which the defendant was to take out the policy. This perhaps explains why the policy issued on the 21 June 1996 indicated the defendant as the main insured. Why would the defendant send the building contract to the plaintiff, if the defendant did not want the plaintiff to have regard to it?
 Coming back to the interpretation of the insurance agreement, the issue being whether the defendant acted as an agent of Fregate Island Ltd, counsel for the defendant argued that the issue should be considered in context in the light of the following:
That in the letter of the 6 March 1996 requesting for a quotation, it was indicated that the defendant was requested by Fregate to ask for the quotation and that the insurance policy will be taken out in the name of Fregate Island Resort Ltd.
That in the proposal from Mr Fraser indicated that he was signing for Fregate Island Resort Insurance.
 I may also indicate that the submission by counsel on behalf of the defendant should also be seen in the light of the fact that the main insured in terms of the schedule issued on the 21 June 1996 was changed to Fregate Island Ltd as per schedule issued on the 11 March 1997 at the request of the defendant. All of these raised another issue.
WHETHER NOMINATION OF MAIN INSURED OR ANY INSURED OR BENEFICIARY IN AN INSURANCE POLICY MAKES SUCH INSURED OR BENEFICIARY LIABLE FOR PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM?
 I understood the contention by counsel on behalf of the applicant to be that the trial court’s finding in favour of the plaintiff should be seen in the light of the relationship between the two contracting parties to the insurance agreement. That is, the plaintiff and the defendant and not much of the nomination of the insured entities and or persons in the policy document. In making this submission, counsel for the plaintiff took the view that through out, the defendant negotiated with the plaintiff. Secondly, that the first premium came from the defendant. Whilst the defendant contended that it was just a link between the plaintiff and Fregate Island Limited to facilitate the indemnity cover, its version should be rejected in the light of the following:
The defendant was doing a building work for Fregate Island and therefore it was the defendant which was at a higher risk and therefore the need for the insurance cover.
The defendant was made and agreed to pretend as if it was an agent for the Fregate Island Limited for the purpose of obtaining a tax concession as told by Dr Happel of Fregate Island Limited. Both parties that is, the defendant and Fregate Island Limited would therefore have benefited from a tax concession in the event of a paid out claim.
In terms of the building agreement, the defendant was to take out an insurance policy and the building contract was made available to the plaintiff before the issue of the policy document. This in my view, was contrary to the signing of the proposal form for Fregate Island Limited. At best the proposal form was for both the defendant and Fregate Island Limited. Of importance, however the proposal form did not identify the party liable for payment of the premium. Therefore, even if the proposal form was signed for Fregate Island Limited, one cannot infer liability by Fregate Island Limited to pay the premiums regard been had to the cumulative facts of the case.
In the letter of the 6 March 1996 asking for the insurance quotations, whilst the defendant nominated Fregate Island Resort Ltd as the insured, it did not deal with the liability to pay the insurance premium. For the fact that the quotation was for Fregate Island Limited and that the insurance policy was to be taken out in its names could not conclusively have served as a liability to pay the premiums. Put it differently, this way, why would the defendant want to take the insurance policy in the names of Fregate Island Ltd if it was to carry building work of such magnitude on the island? Surely, this was motivated by the tax concession. In my view, this had nothing to do with the negotiator’s liability to pay the premiums. Remember, the plaintiff never had any discussion with Fregate Island Ltd regarding the insurance policy. It has always been the defendant.
In the letter of the 4 September 2006 seeking for the change of the main insured company, the defendant elected not to make it clear as to who was responsible for payment of the premium. Secondly, he made no mention of the capacity under which it was seeking for the change of the main insured. It was in this letter that the defendant’s broker was requested to fetch the cheque for the first premium of US$38 880,00. This is the letter sent to the defendant’s broker in terms of which the plaintiff’s brokers were to be instructed to effect the change of names of the main insured.
On the 4 March 1997 and acting on behalf of the defendant, Terry McDonough & Co. (PTY) Ltd (the brokers) instructed the plaintiff’s brokers to increase the contract value by 1 200 000 US dollars. In this letter it was further stated as follows: “Please advise premium due”. I must immediately indicate that the plaintiff in response to and after having effected the increase premium due was calculated as 1745 US dollars, which formed the subject of the claim by the plaintiff against the defendant. This raises another issue.
COULD THE DEFENDANT HAVE DELEGATED ITS ALLEGED AGENCY WITH THE FREGATE ISLAND TO TERRY MCDONOUGH & CO. (PTY) LTD?
 Clearly, Terry McDonough & Co. (PTY) Ltd acted as a broker or an agent of the defendant. The request for the increase of the contract value and the premium due was not on behalf of Fregate Island Ltd. Any suggestion that the plaintiff should look for such payment from Fregate Island Ltd would defeat against one sense of logic in the circumstances of the matter. Of importance, even in the letter of the 4 March 1997, it was not suggested that Fregate Island Ltd was liable for the payment of the premium, nor was it suggested that the defendant would not be liable for such payment.
 Similarly, this should be seen in the light of the premium due, resulting from a request for extension of the insurance contract period. The request for extension came from the defendant. Such a request is contained in the letter dated the 9 April 1996. Firstly, in this letter there is nothing to suggest that the extension was at the request of Fregate Island Ltd. The only reference in the letter was the policy number in question dash Fregate Island Resort. Secondly, the letter is silent as to the entity responsible for payment of the premium. Of importance, however is for the fact that the request was made by the defendant. The fact that Fregate Island Ltd/Resorts was the main insured makes no difference inasmuch as there were other insured including the defendant covered in the policy. This extension resulted in the premium payable being 11 165 US dollars as indicated in the letter dated the 23 May 1997 addressed to Mr Ian A Fraser. This letter was subsequent to the letter of the 10 April 1997 addressed to the said Mr Fraser of the defendant. In this letter reference was made to request for extension contained in the letter dated the 9 April 1997 and the defendant was advised that the policy will be extended to the 30 September 1997. The defendant was further advised that the necessary documentation to this effect would be sent to the defendant’s brokers.
 In the light of all of these, I cannot find that the trial court erred in interpreting the agreement as conferring no agency status on the defendant. Both the requests for cover as a result of the increase in the value of the contract and as a result of the extension of the contract period were made by or on behalf of the defendant without making reference to Fregate Island Ltd as a principal to such requests. Interpretation of the contract or policy document being ambiguous as to who must pay the premium should therefore be considered in the light of all these surrounding factors to establish the parties’ intention when the agreement of insurance was concluded.
 The general rule that the insured must be held liable for payment of the premiums should also be seen in the light of all these factors, including the fact that there are several insured nominated in the schedule. At the risk of repeating myself, I may indicate that even the request for the change of the main insured was made without reference to the defendant acting as an agent of its principal (Fregate Island Ltd). This should then bring me to consider the other point which was argued by counsel on behalf of the defendant.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN FINDING FRAUD RENDERING THE AGREEMENT VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE WAS NOT PROVED?
 The issue of fraud first surfaced in the plea. Secondly it was persisted through out the trial and also in this appeal. The simple answer to this by the plaintiff as I understood it was that, no such fraud has been proved by the defendant. Secondly, that even if there was a fraud, the plaintiff was not a guilty party thereto and lastly, that the defendant in any event elected to act in terms of the agreement despite the alleged fraud.
 Initially, I had some difficulties in understanding the basis for reliance on fraud as vitiating the insurance agreement. It transpired during discussion that the basis was this; the plaintiff allegedly paid out a fraudulent claim to a third party, Marine and Engineering Works. The payment was said to be out of the policy under discussion. The payment was for the sum of SR 288 000 for the crane lost on the Pruslin Hero. The crane was not covered in terms of the policy METCAR00009. The submission in this regard was stated as follows in the heads of argument:
“38. The evidence has further shown that an act of fraud must have been committed in respect of the policy, in that there was no basis in law to make payment of SR 288 000 for the crane lost on the Pruslin Hero. Despite Mr Woodcock’s protestations, it is apparent that the crane was not covered on the CAR policy, METCAR000009, which paid out for the loss. And the attempts to get re-insurers to contribute to paying the claim must lead this court to the inference that the respondent was engaged in underhand activities, to the prejudice of the re-insures and underwriters that were then expected to chip in to cover the loss. Either the plaintiff was fraudulent or Fregate Island Ltd was fraudulent, but in either instance there was an act of fraud, which in terms of the contract renders the contract void” (My own emphasis).
 It is clear from this quotation that the submission is not made on hard facts. This is consistent with the evidence which was adduced on behalf of the defendant in this regard. Apparently, the allegation or averment of fraud in the plea was made on the basis of certain information received by Mr Fraser on behalf of the defendant. This information has never been confirmed and it therefore remained hearsay.
 During the discussion, counsel on behalf of the defendant argued that Mr Woodcock on behalf of the plaintiff conceded in his evidence that the claim should not have been paid out in the first place. On page 373 of the record his evidence proceeded as follows:
“Question: And with regard to this Crane, were you aware of
any fraud involved in this matter?
Answer: Not to my knowledge your worship. I do not recall any fowl pay because we thought it was a genuine accident. The captain of the barge lost his life and the boat was severely damaged. It took about a week to rescue the boat and also the crane. So I do not think there would be some fowl play there.
Question: If there was fowl play, who would have established that?
Answer: First of all the insurance company since we appointed a marine surveyor and obviously if the marine surveyor could prove that there was fowl play, obviously we would not have entered into the claim your worship”.
Further under cross examination on page 466 of the record his evidence proceeded as follows:
“Question: And I think we have already established that you made the payment of the 288 000 in good faith, not because you were legally obliged to pay it, but you made it in good faith?
Answer: We entertained the claim under the policy your worship.
Question: Yes, but having gone through the policy, it says you were not liable at all while there was default on the part of the insured. So in other words your liability was excluded until premiums were paid and premiums were not paid. You were not actually liable, but you paid in good faith?
Answer: In good faith and barely on the marine surveyor’s report that we appointed. We appointed a marine surveyor. So on his recommendation the claim was based on his report worship.
 The defendant is a party making an allegation of fraud. The onus was therefore on the defendant to prove the alleged fraud. I am satisfied with the trial court’s finding in this regard. The defendant did not succeed in proving such a fraud. The defendant also did not prove that the plaintiff was a party to the alleged fraud. However, even if fraud was proved and the plaintiff was a party thereto, the defendant did not elect to cancel the agreement based on the alleged fraud. At no stage before the institution of the action against the defendant did complain to the plaintiff about the alleged fraud. The defendant enjoyed the benefit of cover despite the alleged fraud. It can’t have it both. It is either continuance with the agreement despite fraud or cancellation thereof. I now turn to deal with the last issue.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT IN FINDING THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THE EXTENSION OF THE INSURANCE COVER FOR THE PERIOD 21 NOVEMBER TO 6 DECEMBER 1997 WAS NOT PROVED?
 This question relates to the cross appeal. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for payment of 1002.00 US dollars being for the premium due as a result of the alleged extension of the cover from the 11 November 1997 to 6 December 1997. The trial court in this regard expressed itself as follows:
“Thirdly whether the plaintiff was entitled to an additional premium of US$1002.00 for the extension from 11 November 1997 to the 6 December 1997. As from the exhibit A69 and onward the correspondence suggests that the parties and their respective agents raised the possibility of further cover. However, defendant’s agent indicated to the defendant that due to outstanding premiums the plaintiff would not consider a further extension. Having cleaned the correspondence and considering the evidence as a whole there is no trace of a specific request that the defendant itself or through an agent asked for a further extension although it is clear that such an extension was eventually granted by the plaintiff. I therefore find that the plaintiff has not proved consensus for the last extension and therefore does not have a contractual claim therefore. Possibly on the basis of unjustified enrichment, but such an alternative claim is not before me and need not be considered”.
 With greatest respect to the trial court, I have some difficulties with its conclusion. The request for extension was made. Initially, denied on the basis that arrear premiums should first be paid. But, eventually the plaintiff granted the extension. This extension was never rejected by the defendant. This clearly concluded the agreement. The schedule relating to the extension was issued on the 9 December 1997, showing the acceptance date as the 11 November 1997, being also the effective date. The premium was fixed at 1002 US dollars. The request for the reduction of the rates was rejected by the plaintiff as it appears in the letter dated the 13 November 1997 to its brokers. The same rate was to apply to the values but pro-rate to period. Reduction of the rate could not be granted due to heavy rainfall during August 1997 and all insurance companies raised insurance rates on all classes of business.
 Having conveyed these difficulties to the defendant’s broker, the defendant on the 20 November 1997 was furnished with a copy of the letter dated 13 November 1997 from the plaintiff. Of importance is for the fact that in the letter of the 20 November 1997, the defendant was requested to contact its brokers, should it have a problem with the refusal to reduce the rates or premium. Evidence did not suggest that there was ever any such come back. Of importance is for the fact that the defendant was indemnified for the fact that the defendant was indemnified for the period 11 November 1997 to 6 December 1997. Having found that the defendant was not acting as an agent of Fregate Island Ltd and that there was no fraud which rendered the insurance agreement void, the trial court should be found to have erred in not grating judgment for the plaintiff also in the sum of 1002 US dollars.
 Consequently I make the following order.
The defendant’s appeal is hereby dismissed with costs and the judgment for the plaintiff by the court aquo is hereby confirmed.
The plaintiff’s cross-appeal hereby succeeds and the judgment by the court aquo dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for payment of 1002 US dollars is hereby set aside and substituted by:
“Judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of US$1002.00 with costs plus interest at the rate of 15,5% per annum atempore morae to date of final payment”.
The defendant to pay the costs of the cross-appeal.
M F LEGODI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
E J KOEN INC.
Attorneys for the appellant
227 Middelberg Street
TEL NO. 012 343 4465
KARL ELS ATTORNEYS
Attorneys for the respondent
C/O PB ANGELOPULO & CO.
1st Floor, East Wing
200 Pretorius Street
Tel no. 012 321 7031